LockFlare

Nothing we make ever phones home.

Not to check a licence. Not to count your servers. Not to report a crash. LockFlare Lens opens exactly two kinds of connection — SSH to the servers you point it at, and your own AI provider if you choose to use Themis — and neither of them is us. This page explains why it is built that way, exactly what we hold, and how to prove it for yourself in five minutes.

What LockFlare holds about you

1. the email on your account
2. the IP addresses you licensed

That is the complete list. Not a summary of it — the list. The address is kept for one purpose: so your licence can be reissued. We do not know what that server is, what it runs, or where. No card details either; payments go straight to Stripe.

What "air-gapped" means here, precisely

The word gets used loosely, so here is the version you can check against a packet capture rather than against a marketing claim.

No licence check, ever

Lens never asks us whether you are allowed to run it. A licence is a signed key opened on your own computer; the signature is the proof. There is no activation server to be down, to throttle you, or to log that you opened the app at 3 am.

No telemetry, no crash reports

No usage counters, no feature analytics, no "anonymous diagnostics" that turn out not to be. If something breaks, you tell us — or you do not, and we never learn about it.

No update ping

Lens does not poll for new versions in the background. Even the model catalog Themis picks from is a file the build ships with, refreshed only when you press the button.

No account, no session

There is nothing to log into. Your identity is an encrypted key on a USB drive plus Touch ID, both on your desk. Nothing is validated against anything of ours.

Your servers only

Every reading and every change travels over the SSH session you opened, with your credentials, checked by that server's own sshd. There is no relay, no proxy and no LockFlare hop in the path.

Themis calls your provider

The one other connection Lens can make: to Anthropic, OpenAI or xAI, with your key, on your bill, only when you ask her something. We are not in that conversation and never see a byte of it.

This is why the licence is a key you paste

People sometimes read the activation step as friction. It is the opposite: it is what a licence has to look like when the software refuses to call home.

A conventional product checks a licence server. That check is a phone-home by definition — it tells us you are running, from which address, how often, and against how many machines. So a licence in Lens is not a check, it is an artifact: a short string signed by LockFlare's private key, carrying the account or the server address inside it. Lens opens it with the public half built into the app, verifies the signature on your computer, and reads the address out of it. Nobody is asked. Nothing is reported. It works with your network cable unplugged.

That is also why the key comes from a web page in your browser rather than from inside the app: one deliberate visit, made by you, instead of a permanent channel opened by us. And it is why a server licence names one IP address — that address is the only thing the key needs to carry to be checkable offline, and it is the second of the two things we hold.

Zero-knowledge architecture: what that actually means here

The term gets stretched, so here is our version in one sentence: the only thing we keep about a server is the IP address on its licence, and the only reason we keep it is so that licence can be reissued. Not to profile you, not to count you, not to know anything about the machine — the address is literally written inside the signed key, so it has to exist somewhere for us to be able to put your licence back when you lose it.

We do not know what that server is. Not its hostname. Not its operating system or version. Not whether it runs a database, a website, a mail server or nothing at all. Not its provider, its region, its size, its role, or what you call it. Not whether it is still alive. The licence issuer holds an email address and a list of addresses that were licensed to it, and that is the entire record.

We do not hold your payment details either. Card payments go straight to Stripe; the number is entered on their form, handled by them, and never touches a LockFlare system. We receive a confirmation that a payment cleared, and we issue a key. There is no card on file, because there is no file.

And on the operational side, the list of what we never see is the whole product: your fleet map, your groups and notes, your SSH credentials, private keys and sudo passwords, your certificate vault, repository secrets and API keys, your snippets, boards, templates and NOC diagrams, your database logins, your backup destinations, your team, what your servers run, what versions they are on, how many boxes you really manage, when you last opened the app, or anything you did in it.

None of that is a policy that could be reversed by a change of management or compelled by a subpoena. It is arithmetic: those things live in a file on your computer, sealed under the signature of the key drive that unlocks Lens, and in an encrypted backup on that drive. There is no server of ours they were ever copied to, so there is nothing to hand over, sell, lose, or be asked for.

Why we would rather have an empty room

The two arguments that made this design worth its cost.

There is no honey pot to breach

Consider what a compromise of a conventional server-management vendor yields: account credentials, server inventories, connection details and stored keys for every customer at once. One break-in, thousands of networks. That central store is the most valuable thing such a company owns and the most dangerous thing it holds.

We do not have one. If LockFlare were compromised tomorrow, an attacker would find the licence issuer — a list of email addresses and the IP addresses licensed to them — and nothing else. No fleet maps, no credentials, no card numbers, and no way to tell from that list what any of those machines even is, let alone a way into one. The prize is not worth the effort, which is the only security property that scales.

Data you never collect cannot be mishandled

Storing customer infrastructure data is a liability before it is a feature: it has to be encrypted, access-controlled, retained, deleted on request, disclosed when it leaks, and defended in every vendor review and data-protection questionnaire you will ever fill in.

Collecting two fields removes most of that surface. There is no processing of infrastructure data to describe, no sub-processor holding your fleet, no export to argue about, and no breach notification we could ever owe you about your servers — because your servers were never in our systems. It also makes a security review short, which is the practical benefit you will feel first.

The trade-off, stated plainly

Absolute privacy has a price and we would rather you hear it from us than discover it on a bad day.

What we can do. Because we hold your email and your licensed addresses, we can put your licences back. Recovery asks for the account email, its password and the IP address of one server you licensed, mails a code to that mailbox, and hands back every licence as one bundle you paste into Lens. Your entitlements are safe with us, because entitlements are all we keep.

What we cannot do. We cannot restore your map, your saved logins, your certificate vault, your snippets or your boards — not because of a policy, but because we have never had a copy. If you lose the drive and every backup of it, that work is gone and no support call can change it.

Which is why Lens ships three ways to protect it, and all three are yours. The encrypted backup written onto the key drive itself, holding the whole map, the vault and the saved credentials, sealed under a passphrase and under the drive. A travel copy, so the same identity works on a second computer. And a duplicate drive, made in a locked ceremony, for the drawer or the other bag. Set up the first two the day you install; the third takes two minutes.

Cipher: the same principle, in a product that must move code

Lens can be air-gapped because it never needs to move anything between machines. Cipher does: its entire job is to get your application onto servers, sometimes servers you do not own. So it applies the same principle at a different layer, and we would rather be exact about the difference than borrow a word that does not fit.

Your source is packed and encrypted with AES-256-GCM on your own machine, before anything leaves it. What travels is ciphertext. What is stored is ciphertext. What arrives on the server is ciphertext, decrypted only into volatile memory and never written to that disk in the clear. The control plane routes builds and keys them to the machines licensed to run them; plaintext is not part of its job at any point in the path.

So: Lens is air-gapped, and Cipher is zero-knowledge by construction. Both come from the same conviction — that the safest thing to do with your data is not to be able to read it.

Do not take our word for it

Every claim on this page is observable from outside the application. Five minutes with tools you already have.

Watch the wire

Run a packet capture on your own machine while you use Lens — unlock it, open servers, run jobs, take a backup. Every connection you see will be SSH to an address you typed, and nothing else.

Block us at the firewall

Deny lockflare.com and cdn.lockflare.com outright on the machine running Lens, then work normally for a day. Nothing degrades, nothing nags, nothing stops. The only thing you will lose is the download page.

Unplug the internet

Keep only your local network, or a VPN to your own boxes. Lens unlocks, your map opens, your servers connect, and every tool works — because the licence was verified on your computer, not ours.

Read what is on the box

After Lens has managed a server for a month, look for what it left: one folder if you allowed Themis, a named file per tool it configured, and no process of ours. It is all listed on the front page.

Ask for the certificate

Our ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certification and the scope behind it are available on request, and the Statement of Applicability under NDA. Trust and compliance.

Ask us anything harder

If a claim here does not hold up to something you tried, we want to know before your security team does. Write to us with "security" in the subject.

Who this is for, honestly

This design is not for everyone, and pretending otherwise would be the first dishonest thing on the page.

It fits you if

You would rather hold your own keys than trust a vendor's key management. You have to answer for what leaves your network. You have been through a supplier breach, or read enough of them. You want infrastructure tooling that cannot be turned into a way in.

It does not fit you if

You want a "forgot password" button that recovers everything from a cloud account, a web dashboard your team can open from anywhere without carrying anything, or a vendor who can log in and fix your fleet for you. Those are legitimate needs; they are just not what this is.

Two fields. That is the whole relationship.

Create an account, download Lens, and check the wire yourself.

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